I. INTRODUCTION
The new rules of procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights -in force since 2001 -introduced important developments in the InterAmerican system of protection of human rights. In particular, the system today allows victims of alleged violations of human rights to make direct representations before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter "the Court").
1 However, this fundamental development contrasts with another feature of the system which, in the view of this author, undermines fundamental principles of due process, equality of arms of the parties, and legality, in certain proceedings before the Court, to the detriment of the victims. I am referring to the up to very recently unchallenged practice of the Court (in the context of individual complaints where the nationality of the respondent State is not represented in its Bench) to allow one party only in the proceedings -the alleged violator State -to appoint an ad hoc judge to join the panel of judges to sit in judgment in the case. The following article firstly assesses the legality of such a practice under the American Convention on Human Rights, the Statute of the Court and its new Rules of Procedure in accordance with the general rules of interpretation of the Law of Treaties. Secondly, it discusses the unsuitability of the institution of ad hoc judges in the context of individual petitions -and moreover its use in a manner that discriminates in favour of one of the parties in the proceedings onlywithin the general framework of the International Protection of Human Rights. It is submitted that not only does the use of ad hoc judges in these instances find no legal basis in the Inter-American instruments applicable to the proceedings before the Court and is therefore unjustified, but, moreover, that this institution, devised for specific cases of inter-State litigation and borrowed from areas of public international law where State interests have traditionally played a central role, when taken to the context of human rights litigation in individual complaints (and for the benefit of the alleged violator State only) becomes a "fossil" clearly at odds with fundamental principles of international human rights law. It is further submitted that should the system aim to act in accordance with its own law and to reassure victims of human rights violations in their trust in the independence, impartiality, and proper constitution of the Court to sit in judgment in their cases, the Inter-American system faces the challenge to remove such a feature from its current practice.
II. THE INSTITUTION OF THE JUDGE AD HOC IN THE INTER-AMERICAN INSTRUMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AMERICAN CONVENTION, THE STATUTE OF THE COURT AND ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE

A. The "plain meaning" of the text of the American Convention (and related instruments) with respect to the cases where ad hoc judges may be appointed to hear a case: the absolutely exceptional role of this institution in the context of the Inter-American treaties
In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which codified the principles of treaty interpretation in the area of public international law "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
